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SPEEDY TRIAL IN FLORIDA: HAS THE DEFENDANT'S
SHIELD BECOME HIS SWORD?

The right to a speedy trial is valuable, and it will be zealously guarded by the courts with resolute courage. It is for the protection of personal rights, not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law
nor to defeat public justice.1
The right to a speedy trial is fundamental to the American system of
criminal justice.2 The significance of this right, however, has diminished as
the Nation's trial dockets have become increasingly congested.3 In light of
this congestion,4 the Florida supreme court recently adopted a new rule of
criminal procedure designed to implement the right to a speedy trial. 5
This note examines the historical background of this right, the Florida
experience under a recently repealed speedy trial statute, the position of other
jurisdictions on the basic elements of the right to a speedy trial, and the
ramifications of Florida's new rule.0
EvoLuTION OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRuIL

The speedy trial concept may be traced to the Magna Charta, which
provided: "[T]o none will we sell, to none deny or delay right or justice." 7
Today, a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment s and forty-six
state constitutions. 9 Despite its recognition as a fundamental constitutional
safeguardl0 the speedy trial guarantee has not received the favored status

1.
2.
3.
4.

State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 155, 216 N.W. 787, 788 (1927).
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 80, 38 (1970).
See Appendix B-1, [ II.
See, e.g., U.S. DIRECTOR or ADMINISTRAn VE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT,

FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES Dismcr
COURT, 1969, at 22, 116, 126 (1970);
FLORIDA DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF NARcoTIcs AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELAPSED TIME FROM

ARREST TO TRIAL OF INCARCERATED PERSONS 1-4 (1971).
5. FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.191.
6. The problem of the interstate detainer and its relation to speedy trial are beyond
the scope of this note. For a discussion of the problem see Note, Detainers: A Problem in
Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 COLUm. L. RLxv. 1190 (1948); Note, Convicts-The
Right to Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERs L. REv. 828 (1964).
7. MAGNA CHARTA c. 40 (1215). The common law witnessed many abuses of this right.
For example, as late as the Elizabethan Age, when bail was granted rather freely, most of
those accused of crimes languished in jail for long periods prior to trial. See J. STEPrN,
HisroRy oF CRIMINAL LAW 350 (2d ed. 1952).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides in part: "Mn all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." FED. R. Cium. P. 48 (b) provides a
broader base for the guarantee: "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to
a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer
to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." This rule, however, is rarely
used by the court to justify dismissal. See Mann v. United States, 804 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
9. See Appendix A-I.
10. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 88 (1970).
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of other sixth amendment rights. 1 The United States Supreme Court did
not seriously consider the right to speedy trial until 1905," and the right was
not held applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment until
1966.13
"Speedy trial," as used in the sixth amendment, is a broad term open
to a variety of interpretations. 14 Consequently, the federal courts have had
wide latitude in construing the guarantee and have concluded that a speedy
trial is dependent on the circumstances of each case.' 5 On the state level,
the desire for a more concrete standard has led a majority of states to enact
statutory guidelines implementing the right to a speedy trial. 6 These statutes
reflect a legislative declaration of "what is and what is not . . . a reasonable
or proper delay in bringing an accused to trial . ... ".
FLORIDA'S SPEEDY TRIAL EXPERIENCE

Prior to March 1, 1971, Florida functioned under an outdated speedy
trial statute. 18 The statute was divided into three sections: the first required
a written demand to activate the statute; the second provided for discharge
if the accused was not tried within three court terms; and the third provided
that an accused already in jail for another crime was nevertheless entitled to
a speedy trial.'9 The statute was designed as a supplement to the constitutional guarantee; enacted to give the constitution concrete form and force
by specifying the manner in which the right was to be secured s In recognizing the fundamental significance of the right to a speedy trial, the Florida

11. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
12. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
13. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1966).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (the speedy trial guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial);
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (speedy trial means that delays must
not be purposeful and oppressive); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (the right
to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, being consistent with delays and depending on the
circumstances of each case). Although commentators have stated the intended purpose of the
speedy trial guarantee was to relieve an accused of the hardships of pre-trial incarceration
and to compel law enforcement officials to proceed to trial with reasonable promptness,
no subsequent legislation has more precisely defined the meaning of the sixth amendment.
See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 61 (1951).
15. E.g., Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796, 797 (9th Cir. 1925), holding that because
the speedy trial guarantee was not susceptible to any precise definition it was to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances.
16. See Appendix A-II.
17. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 243, 98 P. 122, 125 (1908). See also Pines v. District Court,
233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574 (1943); cf. Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P.2d 877 (1961)
(statute implementing the constitutional right cannot in any way limit the right of an
accused to a speedy trial).
18. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
19. Id.
20. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/7

2

1972]

Hahn: Speedy Trial in Florida: Has the Defendant's Shield Become his Sw
SPEEDY TRIAL IN FLORIDA

courts held that the statute's purpose was to put the prosecution on notice
that the accused desired a speedy trial21 and to avoid purposeful delay.22
Despite the statute's apparently comprehensive language, protection did
not extend to an accused in all situations. Failure to demand trial resulted
in a waiver of the statute's protection. 23 Furthermore, even if an accused
made a demand it was likely that his trial would be delayed by a continuance. 24 Requests for delays by the prosecution were favored as the granting of a continuance was solely within the discretion of the trial judge.2 5
After a prosecutor requested a continuance, the accused had the burden of
showing that the delay was unreasonable, purposeful, vexatious, and arbitrary 2 6 While the statute required automatic dismissal when an accused
complied with its terms but was not tried,2 7 judicially devised technicalities
often denied an accused's plea for release. In Bates v. Amidon, 28 for example,
the defendant was arrested in February 1969 and released on bail. After
arraignment in June his attorney filed a demand for trial in September.
On the first day of the next court term a second demand was filed. In
December, over the objection of the defendant, the prosecution was granted
a continuance. Further demands were made on the first days of the following
terms of court in January and March. The defendant moved to dismiss the
information on March 27, alleging a denial of speedy trial. Sustaining the
trial court's denial of the motion, the Florida supreme court said it did
not believe the language of the statute2 9 should be literally construed. The
court reasoned that while the statute was intended to protect the defendant, it
was also intended to benefit the state by requiring sufficient notice of a
claim for speedy trial.30 Additional inequities emanated from the judiciary's
unwillingness to give the statute a liberal construction. 31 An accused might
spend as many as six months in jail awaiting trial, and could expect a
minimum delay of sixty days3 2 depending upon the county in which he was
arrested. 33 Consequently, the 1971 Florida Legislature repealed the statute

21. E.g., State ex rel. Retchin v. Turner, 243 So. 2d 168, 169 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971);
Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720, 721 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
22. Kelly v. State ex reL. Morgan, 54 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1951).
23. Id. The statute required a formal demand for trial in three situations: (1) if an
accused demanded trial on the first day of the term during which he was committed but
was not indicted by the last day, he was released to bail; (2) if on bail and three consecutive demands were flied but no trial resulted, the accused was discharged; and (3) if
already incarcerated elsewhere but three demands were made and the accused was not
tried, he was discharged for that crime.
24. See Appendix B-II.
25. FLA. STAT. §§916.02, .08 (1969).
26. State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 219 So. 2d 450, 453 (4th D.C.A.), quashed and
remanded,233 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1970).

27. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
28. 249 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
29. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
30. 249 So. 2d at 2-3.

31. See In re Florida Rules Criminal Procedure, 245 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1971).
32. See Appendix B-11.
33. The statute used the phrase "terms of court." FIA.
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and the Supreme Court of Florida promulgated Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.191 in its place.
FLORIDA'S NEW SPEEDY TRIAL RULE

On its face, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 places Florida
among those jurisdictions statutorily protecting an accused's right to a
speedy trial.34 Although the approach adopted by the rule has been termed
the minority view by some commentators, 5 its protection exceeds that which
is provided an accused in most jurisdictions and surpasses the recommended
standards of the legal profession.36
What Constitutes a Speedy Trial?
While no one denies that an accused isentitled to a speedy trial,37 most
courts have difficulty in determining the scope of this right. Despite the specific
terms of Florida's speedy trial statute, 38 which required automatic dismissal
when three terms of court had passed without trial,3 9 Florida courts consistent-

ly held that an accused was only entitled to a reasonably speedy trial,- conducted in the "due course . . . of appropriate court procedure." 41 Other

jurisdictions with specific statutory standards have arrived at the same conclusion - the right never means an immediate trial but rather one that occurs
without unreasonable delay. 42 Handicapped by the absence of an implementing statute, the federal courts have concluded that the mere passage
of time rarely produces enough prejudice to warrant dismissal. 43 Sheperd v.
United States44 provides the most frequently utilized definition of a speedy
45

trial :

of varying sizes,however, have courts of varying terms. Furthermore, while circuit courts
in most counties and criminal courts of record in large counties each have jurisdiction over
noncapital felonies, FLA. CONST. art. V, §9, the criminal courts of record have six terms of
court per year while circuit courts are limited to two. FLA. STAT. §§32.03 (1), 26.21 (1969).
84. See GA. CODE ANN. §27-1901 (Supp. 1971); IDAHO CODE ANN. §19-3501 (Supp. 1970);
IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1402 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. §62-1481 (Supp. 1970); MIcH. Comp.
LAW ANN. §768.1 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §12-18-7 (1969).
85. See, e.g., Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 846 (1957);
Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587 (1965).
36. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL].
87. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 80 (1970). "The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical
or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly
exposed." Id. at 87.
88. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
39. Id.
40. E.g., Hastings v. Criminal Court, 240 So. 2d 168 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
41. State ex rel. Gayle v. Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 240, 107 So. 267, 269 (1926).
42. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 196 Kan. 421, 411 P.2d 652 (1966).
48. Cf. O'Brien v. United States, 25 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1928) (defendant spent thirteen
months in jail, since he could not post bond); Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796 (8th Cir.
1925) (although the court stated the defendant was entitled to a speedy trial it was uncertain as to the aspects of such a trial).
44. 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947).
45. Id. at 976.
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A speedy trial . . . is one conducted according to prevailing rules,
regulations and proceedings of law, free from arbitrary, vexatious and
oppressive delays. The right does not require trial immediately upon
return of an indictment, nor an arrest made under it, but it does require that trial shall be had as soon as reasonably possible after indictment if found, without depriving the prosecution of a reasonable
time in which to prepare for trial.
Despite the comprehensiveness of the definition, federal courts have not
46
been consistent as to what constitutes a speedy trial.
In an effort to eliminate the inherent injustice of vague guarantees,
Florida's new speedy trial rule specifically limits the time within which an
accused must be brought to trial.47 The specificity of the statute obviates the
judicial necessity of defining a speedy trial on a case-by-case basis. A strict
construction of the rule should remove the vagueness currently shrouding an
accused's right to a speedy trial in Florida, and hopefully it will eliminate
48
judicial use of such equivocal terms as "trial within a reasonable time."
Who Is Entitled to a Speedy Trial?
Generally, to be entitled to the protection of the speedy trial guarantee,
the person seeking relief must formally be accused of a crime. The actual
grade of the offense, however, is immaterial. 49 Consequently, the speedy trial
guarantee has been held inapplicable to the potential defendant, one whose
5
50
arrest has been planned but not consumated. The Florida statute ' gave
52
protection to an accused while on bail, as well as to an accused imprisoned
on an unrelated offense within the state. 53 It was not until the Supreme
Court's decision in Dickey v. Florida,54 however, that the statute was held
applicable to an accused imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction in which Florida
had filed a detained warrant.
While the new Florida rule provides the same basic protection afforded
in the past, it would seem to eliminate some of the injustices prevalent under
the old statute. Under the new rule, time periods begin when an accused is
taken into custody regardless of whether an information has been filed,
thereby assuring the accused of affirmative relief at an earlier date. A question
46. See, e.g., Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968); Dockery v. United
States, 393 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Collier, 862 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1966).
47. FLA. R. Cium. P. 3.191 (a) (1), (2), provide automatic trial within 90 days if the
offense charged is a misdemeanor or 180 days if a felony. If an accused desires to be tried
sooner he may demand trial and must then be tried within 60 days.
48. Hastings v. Criminal Court, 240 So. 2d 168 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
49. See, e.g., Ex parte Munger, 29 Okla. Crim. 407, 234 P. 219 (1925); Wilson v.
Bowman, 381 S.W.2d 320 (rex. 1964).
50. See Ross v. United States, 249 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965), which suggests the extension of speedy trial protection to the "potential defendant" where arrest is delayed for
an "unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time." Id. at 211.
51. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
52. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194(2) (repealed 1970).
53. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-419, §1 (repealed 1970).
54. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
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remains unanswered, however, is whether a person charged with
of a municipal ordinance is entitled to a speedy trial. If the violabe classified as a misdemeanor then it would seem that the accused
protected under the new rule. 55
The Necessity of a Demand for Trial

By requiring an accused to make a formal demand to be tried,56 federal
judges have engrafted a condition upon the protection guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. Unlike other protections afforded by the sixth amendment,5 7 the accused himself must assume the burden of securing a speedy

trial. Until recently the demand doctrine had become so rooted in our
jurisprudence that a seven-year delay attributed to the defendant's failure
to make a demand was held not to be a denial of a speedy trial under the
sixth amendment. 58
Despite the apparent rigidity of the demand requirement in the federal
courts, certain exceptions have evolved. In United States v. Chase59 a charge
was pending against the accused for nineteen years. During that time the
accused was incarcerated for an unrelated conviction, and never filed a
demand for trial. The court refused to find a waiver of the right to a speedy
trial, noting that during his first seven years of imprisonment he was restricted to communicating only with his brother. Moreover, in federal courts imprisonment constitutes an exception to the demand requirement when the
defendant is unaware of the indictment or lacks substantial opportunity to
make a demand.e0 Similarly, another exception has developed where the accused has no knowledge that he has been charged with an offense. 61
2
The demand requirement has been adopted by statute in most states.6
A growing minority of states, however, have unequivocally rejected it and
have placed the burden on the prosecution to secure a speedy trial for an
accused.

5

Recently in Dickey v. Florida,64 Justices Brennan and Marshall, in a
concurring opinion, severely criticized the demand doctrine on three grounds:
first, the financial hardship and emotional instability of a prolonged trial

55.

Cf. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, rehearing denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).

56. See, e.g., United States v. McCorkle, 413 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1969); May v. Georgia,
409 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958); Pletch v. United States, 110 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1940).

57. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
58.

Pletch v. United States, 110 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1940). See also Phillips v. United

States, 201 F. 259 (8th Cir. 1912) (delay of four years held not a denial of a speedy trial).
59. 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. I1. 1955).
60.
61.
62.
63.
passage

Fouts v. United States, 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958).
See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
See Appendix A-VI.
Id. A smaller minority held that the burden shifts to the prosecution after the
of a substantial period of time. See Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.

1968).
64. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
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vitiate the notion that all those accused of crime welcome delay; second,
equating silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction - an accused should not
be required to take affirmative action to preserve a fundamental right; and
third, the burden of securing a speedy trial has been misallocated because an
accused is cloaked with the presumption of innocence and "has no duty to
bring on his trial."65
An early Florida case, Dickoff v. Dewell,66 took a liberal approach to
the demand requirement. The accused in Dickoff properly demanded trial
during three successive court terms, but the prosecution obtained six con-

tinuances over a two-year period. Recognizing that the defendant had made
every effort to secure trial, the court noted that in safeguarding consti-

tutional rights substance rather than mere technical procedure must take
precedence.

7

This liberal approach to the demand requirement was not followed in
other Florida decisions. In State v. Carroll,68 for example, relief was not

granted to the defendant despite his waiting more than a year for trial.
The defendant had repeatedly demanded trial but, because he had succeeded

in having the initial information set aside, he was not credited with any of
his prior demands. Consequently, the appellate court held the trial judge
erred by dismissing the defendant prior to the passage of three terms of
court after the prosecution had re-filed the information.69
More recently, however, a seemingly new Florida judicial attitude has
led to the partial emasculation of the demand requirement. Some courts
have held that after a proper demand for trial, a failure to object to a
prosecution motion for continuance no longer results in a waiver,-0 and a
demand need not be filed on the first day of a court term 71

The problems inherent in the different approaches taken by the Florida
courts with respect to the demand requirement may have been resolved
when Florida enacted the new speedy trial rule. The traditional majority
view of requiring a formal demand as a condition precedent to speedy trial
protection was abandoned in favor of a specific time period within which
trial must be held, without any required initiative on the part of the ac65. Id. at 50. See ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL where rule 2.2 provides that the time
period within which an accused must be tried begins to run without any demand. Further,
rule 2.3 (c) provides that, unless an accused has an attorney, he will not be held to have
consented to any continuance unless he was specifically advised of his right to a speedy
trial and the consequences of a continuance.
66. 152 Fla. 240, 9 So. 2d 804 (1942).
67. Id. at 241, 9 So. 2d at 805. The trial date was set for the first day of the term of
court in issue. On that day prosecution was granted a continuance and later argued that
because the defendant had not demanded trial on the first day he had failed to comply
with the statute's three consecutive term requirement.
68. 240 So. 2d 205 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970). This case was later reversed in Carroll v.
State, 251 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971), where the court declined to rule that the filing of a
motion to test the validity of the information filed against the accused constituted a
waiver of his right to a speedy trial.
69. 240 So. 2d 205, 207 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
70. E.g., State ex rel. Flowers v. Goodman, 241 So. 2d 457 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
71. Woodward v. Edwards, 244 So. 2d 438 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
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cused. 72 Furthermore, an accused who takes the initiative and demands a
73
trial is rewarded with a shorter time period.
In State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman'74 the first case to interpret the new
rule, the court construed the demand provision s very strictly. The question
presented was whether the sixty-day period began upon the filing of the
demand or only after the filing of the information. Although there was no
question that the 180-day period ran from the time an accused was taken
into custody,76 the court held that the sixty-day demand period began to
run only after the filing of an information. Additionally, the court noted
that the purpose of the rule was "to give the court control of its docket"-,
while guaranteeing an accused his right to a speedy trial.
At least one Florida court has stated that the statute's purpose was to
provide an accused with relief in the form of dismissal of charges where the
state fails to follow accusation with trial.78 Although the court in Goodman
seemingly placed only secondary emphasis on the rights of the accused, it
may be argued that the court lost sight of the objective of the speedy trial
guarantee. The Goodman court further diluted the sixty-day demand rule by
stating that after the expiration of sixty days the court should not summarily
dismiss the defendant, but should instead make a subjective determination of
whether the accused was actually prepared to proceed at the time trial was
demanded. If the answer is negative, the "demand for trial should be stricken
as being null and void."7 9 Hopefully, the court's pronouncement intimating
that the primary purpose of the rule is to aid courts in the arrangement of
their trial dockets will be recognized as dictum.
Waiver of the Right to a Speedy Trial
Despite the general rule that courts will make every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to a speedy trial, 0 waiver is still possible
without a showing of intent to waive the right or any knowledge of the
right.8 ' One unfortunate consequence of this dogmatic approach is that an

72. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (a) (1) provides: "[E]very person charged with a crime by
indictment or information or trial affidavit, shall without demand be brought to trial
within 90 days if the crime charged be a misdemeanor, or within 180 days if the crime
charged be a felony." (Emphasis added.)
73. If a trial is demanded it must begin within sixty days. FLA. R. CRI8. P. 3.191 (a) (2).
No other state gives an accused an option to demand trial. The statutes either require or
do not require demand. See Appendix A-VI.
74. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
75. FLA. R. CR181. P. 3.191 (a) (2).
76. Id.
77. 253 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1971) (emphasis added).
78. See Gossett v. Hanlon, 195 So. 2d 865 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967), for a discussion of
the purpose of a speedy trial in Florida.
79. 253 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. 1971).
80. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
81. Where the defendant was represented by counsel a number of cases have denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. The defendants were not
allowed to assert lack of "actual knowledge" of the right to a speedy trial in mitigation of

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/7
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accused may languish in jail with no remedy to force his release.82 Thus,
under the original Florida statute 3 an accused was deemed to have waived
his right to a speedy trial where he failed to demand trial or failed to object
to the prosecution's motion for continuance. 4 Moreover, Florida courts have
stated that "the right to a speedy trial may be waived where a defendant
consents to delay or both prosecution and defense agree to stipulate for postponement."as Further, in a majority of jurisdictions, including Florida,
delays caused by an accused are considered a waiver and therefore not
grounds for dismissal.8 6 Generally, both the prosecution and the accused are
allowed a reasonable time to prepare for trial,8 7 but if an accused either
consents or acquiesces to the state's motion for continuance he is usually
deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial88 Hence, passive inaction
by an accused may result in waiver of a fundamental right.8 9
In addition to implied waivers, affirmative waiver of the right may arise
in several contexts: when an accused requests a change of venue;9 0 when an
accused files motions attacking an indictment; 91 when a co-defendant moves
for a severance; 92 when the accused procures the absence of material wit-

their failure to make a timely demand for trial. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d
117 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Aadal, 280 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). This view
was severely criticized in United States v. Richardson, 291 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
where the defendant was allowed to rely on his attorney's assurance of no further prosecution by the federal government. Although no demand was ever fied, the court held the
defendant had not waived his right to a speedy trial when the Government attempted to
prosecute four years later.
82. Once the receiving court determines an accused has waived his right to a speedy
trial he will not be permitted to allege a denial of a speedy trial as grounds for dismissal.
See United States v. McCorkle, 413 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lustman, 258
F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
83. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
84. State ex tel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970); Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d
555 (Fla. 1957); State v. Williams, 73 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1954); State ex tel. Gayle v. Dowling,
91 Fla. 236, 107 So. 267 (1926); Cacciatore v. State, 226 So. 2d 137 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
But see State ex tel. Flowers v. Goodman, 241 So. 2d 457 (3d D.G.A. Fla. 1970).
85. State v. Holloway, 147 Conn. 22, 156 A.2d 466 (1959); State v. Williams, 73 So. 2d
295, 296 (Fla. 1954); State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 229 So. 2d 595, 597 (3d D.C.A. 1969), rev'd,
238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958); State ex tel. Gayle
v. Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 107 So. 267 (1926); People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W.60
(1933).
87. Scott v. State, 101 Fla. 250, 134 So. 50 (1931).
88. Loy v. Grayson, 99 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1957); State v. Williams, 73 So. 2d 295 (Fla.
1954); Woodward v. Edwards, 244 So. 2d 438 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); State v. Williams, 230
So. 2d 185 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); cf. State ex rel. Flowers v. Goodman, 241 So. 2d 457 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
89. Morrero v. Turner, 246 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1971).
90. Power v. State, 43 Ariz. 329, 30 P.2d 1059 (1934); State v. Farrar, 206 Mo. App. 339,
227 S.W. 1078 (1921). Contra, Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
91. State v. Barger, 148 Kan. 590, 83 P.2d 648 (1938); Murray v. State, 19 Okla. Crim.
322, 198 P. 973 (1921).
92. People ex tel. Woodruff v. Matson, 129 I1. 591, 22 N.E. 456 (1889).
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nesses; 93 when an accused becomes a fugitive; 94 or occasionally, when a mistrial has been granted. 5 However, where a state's witness is unavailable for
trial,96 or where the defendant requests a change of venue, the defendant
97
will not be deemed to have waived the right.
The American Bar Association's Speedy Trial Standards9- on waiver exclude all delays occasioned by the defendant from the computation of the
period within which he must be tried. 99 Similarly, delays resulting from the
trial of other charges, or delays resulting from hearings concerning competence to stand trial, are specifically excluded. 00 Moreover, where an accused
requests or fails to object to a motion for continuance, 1" or where an accused is absent and unavailable for trial, the period of absence is not included.0 2 The American Bar Association (ABA), in essence, has adopted the
majority view regarding waiver in situations that are covered by the Association's report.1 o3
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 does not recognize a mere
failure to demand trial as waiver.104 However, it does provide that any unexcused delay occasioned by the accused will result in a denial of his motion
to dismiss.' 0 5 The rule recognizes four instances in which a continuance
may be granted: upon a written, signed stipulation; upon the court's own
motion; upon a showing of good cause by the accused; and upon delays
resulting from hearings on competency, pretrial motions, and interlocutory
0 6
appeals.
Although Florida's rule is devoid of explicit waiver provisions it should
be noted that the Florida speedy trial statute0 7 also failed to contain a
specific waiver provision. Waiver, however, arose through judicial interpre-

93. In re Morgan, 57 N.D. 763, 224 N.W. 209 (1929).
94. Hart v. United States, 183 F. 368 (6th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 609 (1911).
95. See Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, 54 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1951); State ex rel. Gayle v.
Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 107 So. 267 (1926). But see Ruester v. Turner, 250 So. 2d 264 (Fla.
1971).
96. Anderson v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 720 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
97. State ex rel. Johnson v. Edwards, 233 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1970).
98.

ABA STANDARDS, SPFEDY TRIAL.

99. Id. §2.3.
100. Id. §2.3 (a).
101. Id. §2.3 (c).
102. Id. §2.3 (e).
103. Subsection 2.3 (h) provides a general catchall with "[o]ther periods of delay for
good cause." The ABA would therefore look to local law in a situation not enumerated to
determine if there had been waiver.
104.

FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (d) (2) indicates there may be waiver at any time upon

voluntary written stipulation. Subsection (a) (1) specifically states that the time period
trial begins immediately upon arrest with no need to demand trial; hence, there is
waiver. Even before adoption of the rule, however, Florida courts often leaned toward
minority view of no waiver. E.g., State ex rel. Flowers v. Goodman, 241 So. 2d 457
D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
105. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (d) (3).
106. Id. 3.191 (d) (2).
107. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
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tation.108 The Florida supreme court has recently indicated 0 9 that, despite
the absence of explicit provisions, the same waiver principles may exist under
the new rule. In discussing the optional demand requirement 1 1 the court
noted that if an accused has not prepared for trial prior to filing demand, the
demand should be stricken as being "null and void.""' The issue that remains unanswered is whether the accused, by not being prepared for trial,
has completely waived his right to a speedy trial.
May the accused be precluded from again demanding trial within sixty
days or is he merely entitled to the minimal guarantee of 180 days? The
probably answer is that the defendant has not lost his right to a speedy
trial. In State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen" 2 the defendant had demanded trial
under the rule but had later obtained a continuance, thus waiving the rule's
protection."Is Stating that in the absence of the time limitations specified
in the rule the right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative and dependent
upon all surrounding circumstances, the court held that the defendant may
file a second demand when he is ready for trial. In the absence of a
demand following a continuance, trial will automatically commence within
4
ninety days of the defendant's filing a motion for discharge."
Prejudice and Undue Delay
The words "prejudice" and "undue delay" are terms of art that allow
courts to excuse delay with relative ease."1 Only where a court finds that
the delay has been arbitrary, purposeful, oppressive, vexatious, or even
negligent will it discharge an accused because of prejudice to his case." 6
The rule in the federal courts had been that the mere passage of time will
not supply the necessary prejudice to have charges dismissed."17 Later, the
federal courts liberalized their view and held that passage of a substantial
period of time would cause cose scrutiny of the delay" 8 and that an extraordinary lapse might be a per se violation of the right to a speedy trial."19
However, in United States v. Ewell 20 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule

108. This pattern developed in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §27-1901
(Supp. 1971); hL.. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5 (1972); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-1402 (Supp. 1971);
KAN. STAT. ANN.

§62-1431 (Supp. 1970).

109. State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
110. FLA. R. CRi. P. 3.191 (a) (2). If trial is demanded the accused must be tried within
60 days, as compared with § (a) (1) providing for trial within 90 or 180 days.
111. State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129, 180 (Fla. 1971).
112. 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971).
113. Id. at 863.
114. Id. at 864.
115. See Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587, 1590-97
(1965).
116. Hanrahan v. United States, 848 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
845 (1967).
117. Finton v. Lane, 856 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 U.S. 964 (1966).
118. Fouts v. United States, 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 884 (1958).
119. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955).

120. 883 US. 116 (1966).
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that a showing of prejudice is essential notwithstanding a substantial passage
of time. In Ewell the Court found that a delay of nineteen months between
the initial arrest and the hearings on the subsequent indictment was not a
per se violation. The mere passage of time was not sufficient because the
defendant, a party to the delay, successfully quashed the initial indictment.
Most jurisdictions with similar speedy trial statutes1 21 have concluded
that where an accused has properly made demand and is not tried, undue
delay is presumed. 122 When the prosecution cannot show good cause for such
delay the accused is automatically discharged. 1 23 Under Florida's statute1 24
the passage of the statutory time period plus the proper demands were the
only requirements for dismissal. 25 Thus, a defendant, without any preparation or desire to be tried, would be discharged if not tried within the statutory
26
period following demand.1
"Prejudice" and "undue delay" are important concepts to an accused
when delays are viewed in light of their personal and legal effect. Long
delays before trial frequently impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself.12 7 The testimony of witnesses may be lost and evidence may be
misplaced or destroyed12s Moreover, pending criminal prosecution not
only impairs the accused's opportunity for employment 29 but the accompanying mental anguish often leads to mental disability. 3 0
The American Bar Association Standards'2 ' have adopted the view that
no showing of prejudice is required for discharge. The passage of the suggested time limit, without more, is enough to raise the presumption of a denial
of speedy trial.132 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 similarly provides that the passage of the prescribed time period is sufficient to require
dismissal.33

121. E.g., Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971) (required trial within three
terms of court upon proper demand).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rojas v.
Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 364, 414 P.2d 740 (1966).
123. See, e.g., State v. Soucie, 234 Ind. 98, 123 N.E.2d 888 (1955); State v. Latil, 92 So.
2d 63 (La. 1956); State v. Fish, 122 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 1963).
124. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
125. State ex rel. Retchin v. Turner, 243 So. 2d 168 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
126. State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971); State v. Williams, 230
So. 2d 185 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
127. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
128. Cf. Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (passage of time makes
proof of any fact more difficult); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd
mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955); United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955). These
factors are applicable to the prosecution as well as to the defendant.
129. United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963).
130. United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1963).
131. ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL.
132. Id. §4.1.
133. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (a) (1).
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Reasons for Delay of Trial - Good Cause
Most speedy trial statutes contain a qualifying clause that generally provides that an accused will be discharged upon completion of the statutory
period unless the prosecution can show good cause.13 4 While Florida's
statute did not contain such a provision l 5 it did permit delay if a witness
could not be located or was temporarily out of the jurisdiction.3 6 Additionally, delays were permitted when either the prosecution or defense was
granted a continuance.137 Consequently, "good cause" for delay has been
implicitly recognized in Florida. 38
Delay may originate from three sources: the accused, the prosecution,
and the court. Where it results from actions of an accused, courts are never
hesitant to toll the right to a speedy trial. 3 9 Prosecution-created delays,
however, will be sustained on a finding of good cause even though an accused may have to remain in custody for a longer period prior to trial. 40
Thus, delays attributable to the prosecution to procure evidence' 4' or witnesses 42 will be excused absent a showing that the delay was either willful
or due to the prosecution's negligent preparation of its case. 43 The third
type of trial delay emanates from the courts themselves. There is no general
rule as to whether crowded dockets constitute good cause.:, Most jurisdictions have traditionally held that a defendant can only expect a speedy
trial by a method facilitating orderly courtroom procedure. 145 This was the
early Florida view. Thus, one case held that the statute did not require the
accused to be tried except in due course of court procedure. 4 6 R ecently,
however, Florida decisions have held that a crowded trial docket is not good
1 47
cause for delay of a trial.

134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §611.04 (Supp. 1971); Omx. Rxv. STAT. §134.130 (Supp. 1971).
135. Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
186. Thomas v. State, 243 So. 2d 200 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
187. Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, 54 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1951).
138. See text accompanying notes 80-97 supra.
139. Id.
140. E.g., Crow v. United States, 323 F.2d 888, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1963).
141. Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 861, 366-67 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 871 U.S.
814, rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 906 (1962) (prosecution spent two years gathering information). See also People v. Hocking, 140 Cal. App. 2d 778, 296 P.2d 59 (1956).
142. United States v. Farley, 292 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
857 (1962); United States v. Palermo, 27 F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (the Government was
searching for a missing witness).
143. See, e.g., State v. Kunhausen, 201 Ore. 506, 272 P.2d 225 (1954); State v. Keefe, 17
Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122 (1908); cf., United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd
mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (where a delay of seven years, five of which the accused spent
in jail awaiting trial due to the prosecution's motion to change venue, was sufficient for
dismissal of the charges).
144. Evans v. United States, 397 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "IThere is no touchstone of
time to determine a violation of this right." Id. at 676.
145. E.g., King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, 569 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
998 (1959).
146. State ex rel. Gayle v. Dowling, 91 Fla. 236, 107 So. 267 (1926).
147. See State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970); Leonard v. McIntosh,
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Recognizing that court congestion is a major problem in the administration of criminal justice, 148 the ABA Standards provide that in "exceptional
circumstances" crowded dockets will be good cause for delay. 149 The Standards
place the burden upon the prosecution to insure a speedy trial and allow
delay only in extreme circumstances or where injustice would result were
delay not granted. 50
On the other hand, Florida's speedy trial rule provides that court congestion is not an exceptional circumstance that would allow delay.' 5' Moreover, where an accused has demanded trial, the rule states that good cause
for continuance will not be found where there is a lack of preparation, a
failure to obtain witnesses or evidence, a failure to have counsel, or other
unpreparedness for trial. 52 Although seemingly harsh from the defendant's
viewpoint the provision's justification lies in its potential reduction of spurious
demands for trial under the optional sixty-day provision. The rule, unlike
the ABA Standards, lists the exceptional circumstances that will constitute
good cause for delay.' 53 This specific delineation of good cause may prevent
further judicial impairment of the right to a speedy trial.
SANCTIONS -

THE RESULT OF A DENIAL OF A SPEEDY TRIAL

When an accused has been denied a speedy trial the charges are dismissed
and he is discharged.- M The criterion utilized by most courts to determine
if there has been a denial of a speedy trial is whether the statutory time
period has elapsed. 55 If the period 156 is expressed in terms of days and
months the determination is simple. However, time periods expressed in

237 So. 2d 809 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Clark v. Edwards, 234 So. 2d 399 (4th D.C.A.), cert.
denied, 239 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1970). See also Comment, Criminal Law: Crowded Dockets No

No Longer Justify Denial of Speedy Trial, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1971).
148. ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL (Introductory Note).
149. Id. §2.3 (b). The term "exceptional circumstances" is not defined in the report.
Hopefully, jurisdictions that adopt the ABA rule will give this term liberal interpretation,
consistent with the spirit of the entire rule, rather than a more prosecution-oriented and

overly permissive interpretation of delay.
150. ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL §2.3 (d).
151. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (f).

152. Id. §3.191 (c).
153. Id. §3.191 (f). Exceptional circumstances include: (a) unforeseen or unavoidable
incapacity, illness or absence of a person uniquely necessary for a fair trial; (b) unusual
nature of a case making it impossible for the prosecution to proceed within the time
limit; (c) certain evidence is unavailable now to the state but will be available in the
future (limit of two continuances on this ground); (d) a showing by either the state or
the defense that a continuance is necessary due to new developments that would affect the
trial; (e) where delay is necessary so co-defendants need not be severed; and (f) proof by
the state that the accused has caused delay by disrupting the proceedings.
154. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955);
United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
155. E.g., Harris v. State, 84 Ga. App. 1, 65 S.E.2d 267 (1951); Zehrlaut v. State, 203 Ind.
175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951); State v. Underwood, 130 W. Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d 61 (1947).
156. See ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL §2.1.
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"terms of court," such as Florida's speedy trial statute, 57 presented problems
W18
Consequently, Florida
that often led to a denial of the defendant's rights.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 has adopted the ABA recommendations and
provides for an accused to be tried within either sixty, ninety, or 180 days. 159
Jurisdictions vary as to the effect of a speedy trial discharge on subsequent prosecutions for the same offense. Discharge depends primarily upon
the nature of the particular statute 60 if no specific provision regulates its
effect. Various jurisdictions interpret discharge to be an absolute bar while
others view discharge either as no bar or a bar only if the offense constitutes a
misdemeanor.161 The unwillingness of many jurisdictions to consider dismissal
an absolute bar to prosecution reflects the thought that society must be protected from unpunished criminals.l6 2 The majority of jurisdictions, however,
accept total dismissal as the sanction for a denial of a speedy trial. 6 3 This
is the view adopted by both the Florida rule and the ABA.'1'
CONCLUSION

65
However, the
A speedy trial is essential to those accused of crime.
judicial implementation of this right, embodied in the doctrines of demand,
waiver, and good cause, has diluted the right. The various policies offered
in support of the demand doctrine - that an accused should not be released
on a mere technicality,166 that demand prevents an accused from delaying
punishment,167 or that demand provides a longer time for preparation of
a defense' 68 - are no longer relevant. The concepts of demand and waiver
69
originated during an era in which crowded trial dockets were unknown.
When an accused was not tried, the problem was the fault of the accused and
not of the system of criminal justice. Demand and waiver were therefore
justifiable. Today, when an accused demands trial the courts are not physically capable of accommodating him.'170 Thus, the accused who tries to delay his

157. Fla. Laws 1934, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971).
158. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
159. FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.191 (a) (2).
160. Compare CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-7-12 (Supp. 1967), with Mo. REv. STAT.
§545.890 (Supp. 1972) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §781 (1970).
161. See Appendix A-IV.
162. United States v. Cadarr, 197 U.. 475 (1905).
163. See Appendix A-IV.
164. FLA. R. Cpau. P. 3.191 (a) (1); ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY TRIAL §4.1.
165. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970).
166. People v. Markword, 108 Ill. App. 2d 468, 247 N.E.2d 914 (1969).
167. "The constitutional and statutory provisions involved herein were not meant to
shield the guilty man who sits silently by and allows the officers of the state to assume that
he acquiesces in delaying a trial, and then, when it is too late for the mistake to be
remedied, claims his rights. They were meant rather to protect the man who seasonably
makes it known to the proper officers that he claims an early trial, so that his innocence may
be established." Hernandez v. State, 40 Ariz. 200, 205, 11 P.2d 356, 357-58 (1932).
168. United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963).
169. See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857

(1955).
170. See Appendix B-1, Fl.
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trial no longer needs to make overt efforts to accomplish this - the unnecessary court congestion effectuates the delay.
The concept of involuntary waiver 17 as applied to the right to speedy
trial is antiquated. Other fundamental rights may be waived only where the
waiver has been voluntary and intelligent 172 - an affirmative rejection of
the right. Waiver by acquiescence has no place in the speedy trial doctrine.
Similarly, the accused should not bear the burden of establishing prejudice
from undue delay. 173 Prejudice should either be conclusively presumed from
delay beyond the statutory limit or the burden should be on the prosecution
to rebut a presumption of prejudice.
Although the Florida supreme court has taken a liberal position with
respect to the right to speedy trial, most trial judges and prosecutors are not
of the same disposition. 7 4 In response to a questionnaire concerning the
Florida speedy trial rule"15 judges and prosecutors from heavily populated
counties indicated dismay over the rule, while rural judges lauded it. The "no
demand" and "no waiver" provisions of the rule" 6 are due to their crowded
court conditions. Although most indicated they felt the optional demand
provision (sixty days) was too short, they also felt that the rule would not
prejudice the prosecution's chances for a conviction.
The right to a speedy trial can be an effective and useful tool in the
administration of criminal justice. Conversely, it can be a mere judicial
illusion, void of any substantive protection. The framers of the Constitution
intended to make the speedy trial guarantee a substantial right in the tradition of the Magna Charta."7

However, due to an amalgamation of vague

constitutional and statutory language and restrictive judicial interpretation,
the right has become illusory. Florida's recently promulgated speedy trial
rule"78 expresses an awareness of past inequities in the implementation of the
right to a speedy trial. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 manifests
the spirit embodied in the constitutional guarantee and exceeds both the
protection afforded by most other jurisdictions and the recommended standards of the legal profession. 9 Those who view the rule as a "sword" to be
used by an accused to escape the ends of justice should instead be alarmed
at the crowded condition of most court's trial dockets. The responsibility for
this condition should not be placed entirely on the courts, however, as they
cannot control the often inadequate physical facilities and insufficient num-

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Zehrlaut v. State, 230 Ind. 175, 102 N.E.2d 203 (1951).
United States v. McCorkle, 413 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1969).
TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 80.
See Appendix B-III.

176.
177.

FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191 (a) (1).
F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

TO THE CONsTrrr'

ION OF THE UNITED STATES

61

(1969).
178. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
179. ABA STANDARDS, SPEEDY

TRIAL.
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bers on the bench. 80 Rather than being a "sword," the rule has taken the
speedy trial "shield .. .left hanging on the wall of the armory"'181 and
made it a right - strong enough to combat crowded dockets and judicial
inefficiency.
WILLIAM E. HAHN

180. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Dec. 6, 1971, §A at 3, col. 1.
181. State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 615, 198 N.W. 37, 39 (1924).

APPENDIX, A-I
SPEEDY TRIAL - STATE CONsTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING A SPEEDy TRIAL
AlA. CONST. art.1, §6

ALAS. CONSr. art. 1, §11
Aiuz. CONSr. art. 2, §24
ARK. CONST. art. 2, §10
CAL CONSr. art. 1, §13
COLO. CoNsr. art. 2, §16
CONN. CONS?. art. 1, §8
DEL. CONST. art. 1, §7
FLA. CONST. art. 1, §16
GA. CONSr. art. 1, fJ5
HAWAII CONST. art. 1, §11
IDAHO CONSr. art. 1, §13
ILL. CONST. art. 2, §9
IND. CONST. art. 1, §12
IowA CONST. art. 1, §10
KAN. CONSr. Bill of Rights §10
KY. CONsr. Bill of Rights §11
LA. CONsr. art. 1, §9
ME. CoNsr. art. 1, §6
MD. CONS?. Deci. of Rights art. 21
MAss. CONS?. pt. 1, art. 11
MICH. CONSr. art. 1, §20
MINN. CONSr. art. 1, §6
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MIss. CONST. art. 3, §26
Mo. CONST. art. 1, §18 (a)
MONT. CONS?. art. 3, §16
NEB. CONST. art. 1, §11
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14
N.J. CONS?. art. 1, §10
N.M. CONS?. art. 2, §14
OHIO CONST. art. 1, §10
OKLA. CONS?. art. 2, §20
ORE. CONsr. art. 1, §10
PA. CONST. art. 1, §9
R.I. CONS?. art. 1, §10
S.C. CONS?. art. 1, §18
SMD. CONS?. art. 6, §7
TENN. CONS?. art. 1, §9
TEx. CONS?. art. 1, §10
UTAH CONS?. art. 1, §12
VT. CONS?. ch. 1, art. 10
VA. CONST. art. 1, §8
WASH. CONS?. art. 1, §22

W. VA. CONS?. art. 3, §14
WIs. CONST. art. 1, §7
WYO. CONST. art. 1, §10
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SPEEDY TRIAL -

ARIz. R v. STAT. ANN.

STATE STATUTES GUARANTEEING A SPEEDY TRIAL

§13-161 (1956)

(1964)
CAL. PENAL CODE §1382 (West Supp. 1968)
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-7-12 (Supp. 1967)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §6910 (1953)

ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-1708

Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19554, §194 (repealed 1971)
GA. CODE ANN. §27-1901 (Supp. 1971)
HAWAII REV. LAWS §705-3 (1968)
IDAHO CODE §19-3501 (Supp. 1970)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5 (Supp. 1972)
IND. ANN. STAT. § §9-1402, -1403 (1956)
IOWA CODE ANN. §795.2 (Supp. 1971)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §62-1431 (Supp. 1970)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §1201 (1964)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, §72 (Supp. 1971)
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §768.1 (1968)
MINN. STAT. §611.04 (Supp. 1971)
Mo. REV. STAT.

§545.890 (Supp. 1972)

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §95-1703 (1971)
NEB. REv. STAT. §29-1202 (1965)
NaV. REV. STAT. §178.495 (1963)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-11-4.1 (Supp. 1971)
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §30.20 (1970)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-10 (Supp. 1970)
N.D. CENT. CODE §29-18-01 (1960)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2945.71 (Baldwin 1964)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §812 (1970)
ORE. REv. STAT. §134.120 (Supp. 1971)
PA. STAT. tit. 19, §781 (1970)
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §12-13-7 (1969)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-509 (1962)
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §23-2-11 (1967)
TENN. CODE ANN. § §40-2001, -2102 (Supp. 1971)
Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 32.01 (1966)
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-51-1 (1953)

VA. CODE ANN. §19.1-191 (1971)
WASH. R.EV. CODE §10.46.010 (1970)
W. VA. CODE ANN. §62-3-21 (1966)
Wis. STAT. §971.10 (1971)
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §7-234 (Supp. 1971)
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APPENDIX, A-Ill
SPEEDy TRIAL - TIME PERIODS BETWEEN INDICTMENT AND DISMISSAL
Arizona- not defined
Arkansas- by the end of the second court term
California- 60 days
Colorado- by the end of the second court term
Delaware-by the next court term
Florida- 60, 90, 180 days
Georgia - during the court term in which demand is made, or next term
Hawaii - the same court term as indictment
Idaho -by the next court term
Illinois- 120 days
Indiana - two court terms (in jail); three court terms (on bail)
Iowa - 60 days
Kansas - by the end of the second court term
Maine - within the next court term upon demand
Massachusetts - 6 months
Michigan - "without delay"
Minnesota- by the next court term
Missouri- by the end of the second court term
Montana - 6 months
Nebraska -by the end of the second court term
Nevada- 60 days
New Mexico- 6 months
New York - 90 days after arrest and 6 months
North Carolina- by the end of the second court term
North Dakota - within the next court term
Ohio- by the end of the second court term
Oklahoma -within the next court term
Oregon - within "reasonable time"
Pennsylvania -by the end of the second court term
Rhode Island - 6 months
South Carolina - by the end of the second court term
South Dakota-not defined
Tennessee - -within the next court term
Texas -within the next court term
Utah - within the next court term
Virginia- within three court terms
Washington -60 days
West Virginia -within three court terms
Wisconsin - 90 days for a felony; 60 days for misdemeanor
Wyoming -by the end of the second court term
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SPEEDY TRIAL -

SANCTIONS

Arizona - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
Arkansas - discharge
California - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
Colorado - discharge
Delaware - discharge from prison; not from indictment
Florida - discharge
Georgia - discharge
Hawaii - discharge
Idaho - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
Illinois - discharge
Indiana - discharge
Iowa - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
Kansas - discharge
Maine - discharge
Massachusetts - discharge
Michigan - discharge
Minnesota - discharge
Missouri - discharge
Montana - discharge
Nebraska - discharge
Nevada - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
New Mexico - discharge
New York - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
North Carolina - discharge to bail; then next term, discharge
North Dakota - discharge; no bar to subsequent prosecution
Ohio - discharge
Oklahoma - discharge
Oregon - discharge
Pennsylvania- discharge; no bar to subsequent prosecution
Rhode Island - discharge; no bar to subsequent prosecution
South Carolina - discharge except for capital offense.
South Dakota- discharge; no bar to subsequent prosecution
Tennessee - discharge
Texas - discharge
Utah - discharge for misdemeanor; not for felony
Virginia - discharge
Washington- discharge; no bar to subsequent prosecution
West Virginia - discharge
Wisconsin - discharge
Wyoming - discharge
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APPENDIX, A-V
SPEEDY TRIAL - TIME WITHIN WHICH INDICTMENT (OR INFORMATION) MUST BE FOUND
Alabama - n/a
Alaska - n/a

Arizona- 30 days
Arkansas - n/a

California- 15 days
Colorado - without unnecessary delay
Delaware - next term of court
Florida - n/a
Georgia - n/a
Hawaii - n/a

Idaho - next term after held to answer
Illinois - n/a
Indiana - n/a
Iowa - n/a
Kansas - n/a
Maine - n/a
Massachusetts - n/a
Michigan - n/a

Minnesota - next term after held to answer
Missouri - n/a
Montana - n/a

Nebraska - next term after held to answer
Nevada - 50 days
New Mexico - n/a
New York - n/a
North Carolina- next term of court
North Dakota- next term of court
Ohio - n/a
Oklahoma - next term after held to answer
Oregon - 60 days
Pennsylvania - next term
Rhode Island - 6 months
South Carolina- upon demand in the next term
South Dakota- next term
Tennessee - during the term arrested
Texas - next term
Utah - 0 days
Virginia - before end of second term
Washington - n/a
West Virginia - n/a
Wisconsin- 30 days
Wyoming - n/a

APPENDIX, A-VI
SPEEDY TRIAL - JURISDICTIONs REQUIRING AccusED To DEMAND TRIAL
Arkansas - yes
California - yes
Colorado - no
Delaware- yes
Florida -no (optional demand)
Georgia - yes
Hawaii - n/a
Idaho - no
Illinois - no, if accused is incarcerated; yes, if on bail
Indiana - yes
Iowa - no
Kansas-no
Maine-yes
Massachusetts- yes
Michigan - yes
Minnesota -yes
Missouri - yes
Montana - yes
Nebraska - yes
Nevada - no
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New Mexico - no
New York - no
North Carolina - yes
North Dakota - yes
Ohio - no
Oklahoma - yes
Oregon - no
Pennsylvania - no
Rhode Island- yes
South Carolina- yes
South Dakota- yes
Tennessee - n/a
Texas - yes
Utah - yes
Virginia - no
Washington - yes
West Virginia - no
Wisconsin - yes
Wyoming - no
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SPEEDY TRIAL - DELAY IN FLORIDA FEDERAL COURTS1 (federal offenses in Florida 1969)

L Length of Time Pending (as of June 1969) (in months)

Court

Total

Less than
3 mos.

3-6 mos

6-12 mos.

1-2 yrs.

2 yrs.
& over

68
323
261

44
92
96

5
52
57

8
76
37

4
76
32

7
27
39

Northern
Middle
Southern

Cases over
I yr. with
fugitive
4
33
54

II. Median Time Interval Between Filing and Disposition in 1969 (in months)
Court

No.

Dismissed
No.
Median

Plea of Guilty
No.
Median

Court Trial
No.
Median

Northern
Middle
Southern

206
517
548

37
119
92

134
328
317

7
16
43

2.3
9.2
8.1

1.4
1.5
3.0

Jury Trial
No.
Median

*

28
54
96

*

6.5

4.0
7.2
7.1

III. Median Time Interval Between Filing and Disposition in 1969 (in months)
Entire Federal Court System"

1963
1967
]968
1969

1.

DIRECTOR

Total

Dismissed

Plea of Guilty

Court Trial

Jury Trial

1.6
2.5
2.9
2.5

6.9
7.3
7.5
6.4

1.2
1.9
2.2
1.7

1.3
3.9
4.6
4.3

4.8
5.7
5.8
5A

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE

OF

OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

U.S.

COURTS,

ANNUAL

REPORT,

FEDERAL

1969, at 22, 116, 126 (1970).

*Need at least 25 or no median computed
**Total number of criminal offenders in 1963: 34,403; in 1969: 32,796
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SPEEDY TRIAL - DELAYS IN FLORIDA CoURTS1

Counties surveyed:* Alachua, Bay, Brevard, Broward, Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Jackson,
Orange, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota, Volusia, Walton

Time
Incarcerated
Without Trial

Violent
Felonies

Property
Felonies

Total

Less than 30 days
Between 30-90 days
More than 90 days

403 (prisoners)
428 (prisoners)
319 (prisoners)

472 (prisoners)
427 (prisoners)
253 (prisoners)

875
855
572

Delays greater than 90 days (total of 572 prisoners): 442 delays or continuances granted
the defense; 481 delays or continuances granted the prosecution
Conclusion: (1) if a violent felony is committed and the accused cannot make bond,
he may expect an average of 58.98 days in jail prior to trial; (2) if a property felony is
committed and accused cannot make bond, he may expect an average of 65.47 days in jail
prior to trial; (3) in Florida, there is one chance in five of spending more than 90 days
in jail prior to trial.

1. DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF NARCOTICS AND CRIMINAL JusTcE, ELAPsE TIME FRoM
ARiRsr To TRIAL OF INCARCERATED PERSONS 1-4 (Fla. 1971).
*This survey was made only of those accused of crime and who were in jail awaiting
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FLORIDA STATISTICS (responses to questionnaire)

(I) Is there a problem of court congestion in your circuit?
Judges' response
17 yes
14 no
State attorneys' response
6 yes
7 no
(2) Will the new rule prejudice the prosecution's chances for conviction due to insufficient time to prepare for trial?
Judges' response
9 yes
22 no
State attorneys' response
8 yes
6 no
(3) Is the 60 day rule too short?
Judges' response
19 yes
15 no
State attorneys' response
10 yes
5 no
(4) Will the rule require more criminal judges in your circuit?
Judges' response
16 yes
14 no
State attorneys' response
8 yes
7 no
(5) Are you in favor of the new "no demand" rule?
Judges' response
21 yes
8 no
State attorneys' response
3 yes
10 no
(6) Are you in favor of the new no-waiver, without written stipulation rule?
Judges' response
20 yes
9 no
State attorneys' response
4 yes
10 no
(7) Should court congestion be good cause for delay or continuance?
Judges' response
13 yes
20 no
State attorneys' response
10 yes
4 no
(8) Your general opinion of the new rule is?
Judges' response
27 good
6 bad
State attorneys' response
5 good
9 bad
Court congestion statistics from state's attorneys:
Average time spent in jail prior to trial: Violent felonies
4.5 mos.
Felonies
4.3 mos.
Court congestion statistics from judges:
Average time spent in jail prior to trial: Violent felonies
3.5 mos. delay
Felonies
3.6 mos. delay
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